## UNITED STATES BANKRUPTCY COURT SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK

Case No. 09-50026-mg

IN RE: Chapter 11

MOTORS LIQUIDATION COMPANY, . One Bowling Green . New York, NY 10004

Debtor. . Monday, July 18, 2016

A.M. SESSION

10:04 a.m.

TRANSCRIPT OF STATUS CONFERENCE RE: MOTION BY GENERAL MOTORS LLC PURSUANT TO 11 U.S.C. 105 AND 363 TO ENFORCE THE BANKRUPTCY COURT'S JULY 5, 2009 SALE ORDER AND INJUNCTION, AND THE RULINGS IN CONNECTION THEREWITH [13634]; (CC: DOC# 13637, 13636) MOTION FOR ENTRY OF AN ORDER PURSUANT TO FED. R. BANKR. P. 9006(b) EXTENDING THE DURATION OF THE AVOIDANCE ACTION TRUST BEFORE THE HONORABLE MARTIN GLENN UNITED STATES BANKRUPTCY COURT JUDGE

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(Proceedings commence at 10:04 a.m.)

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THE COURT: Please be seated. We're here in Motors <u>Liquidation Company</u>, 09-50026. I first want to take up the motion of Wilmington Trust as avoidance action trust 5 administrator and trustee per an order extending the duration 6 of the avoidance action trust.

MR. FISHER: Good morning, Your Honor. Eric Fisher from Binder & Schwartz on behalf of the avoidance action trust. We're here today on the motion to extend the duration of the 10∥trust through December 15th, 2019. Your Honor, no objection was filed with respect to this motion. The relief requested is justified under Section 4.1 of the avoidance action trust agreement, which allows the trust to apply for extensions of its duration to, quote, "facilitate or complete the recovery and liquidation of the trust's assets," Your Honor.

The only precondition to the extension of the trust is that the trust needs to obtain from the IRS a private letter  $18 \parallel$  ruling indicating that the extension of the life of the trust 19∥ won't adversely affect the trust's status as a liquidating trust. We made that request, Your Honor, to the IRS in February. I'm certainly hoping that we would have the outcome before we had to file the motion to extend the life of the trust. We don't have the private letter ruling yet, Your Honor. We have had communications with the IRS over the past couple of weeks that indicate that we should be getting the

1 ruling that we are anticipating and that we should be getting  $2 \parallel$  it in the next couple weeks. And so what we would respectfully 3 request, Your Honor, is that the Court grant the requested  $4 \parallel \text{relief}$ , but we would not submit an order until we obtain a 5 private letter ruling, and we would then notify the Court of the private letter ruling.

THE COURT: All right. Does anybody else wish to be heard with respect to the motion?

(No audible response.)

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THE COURT: All right. Before the Court is the 11 motion of Wilmington Trust Company, as avoidance action trust 12 administrator and trustee, for entry of an order pursuant to 13 Federal Rule of Bankruptcy Procedure 9006(b) extending duration of the avoidance action trust. The motion is filed as ECF Docket Number 13637. The motion is supported by the declaration of David Vanaskey appended to the motion as Exhibit The motion is unopposed. The motion seeks an extension of 18 the duration of the avoidance action trust for an additional 36 19 months, through and including December 15th, 2019. 20 extension of the duration of the trust is also dependent on the receipt by the trust of a favorable private letter ruling from the Internal Revenue Service that such extension would not adversely affect the status of the trust as a liquidating trust 24 $\parallel$  for U.S. federal income tax purposes. To date, the trust has 25∥ not received a private letter ruling from the IRS.

Upon consideration of the motion, with no objections  $2 \parallel$  being filed in opposition, the Court hereby approves the  $3 \parallel$  motion, granting the 36-month extension of the duration of the 4 trust subject to the following: Given that the extension of 5 the duration of the trust is also dependent on the receipt of 6 the private letter ruling from the IRS, the Court will hold the entry of the order in abeyance until such time as the letter is received. The trustee shall promptly notify the Court of the receipt of the letter ruling, at which time the approval order will be entered.

Thank you, Mr. Fisher.

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MR. FISHER: As Your Honor is aware, there was 13 another motion on for today, which was withdrawn on Friday.

Yes. And I saw that there's a 9019 THE COURT: that's scheduled. This is with respect to the funding of the trust, and I've seen papers about it, I quess, where it's -there's a date in August when that 9019 is on.

MR. FISHER: Yes, Your Honor, August 5th.

THE COURT: Okay. Thanks very much, Mr. Fisher.

MR. FISHER: Thank you.

THE COURT: All right. So now, let's move to the status conference in connection with the June 2016 motions to enforce the plan injunction and adjournment of the hearing in connection with the second June 2016 motion to enforce.

Obviously, the Second Circuit's decision in Motors

Liquidation, which I guess -- what was the date of the order --2 decided July 13th, 2016, probably just about the time, 3 Mr. Steinberg, you submitted your reply brief.

MR. STEINBERG: Yes, Your Honor. It was a busy 5 morning.

THE COURT: It was a busy morning, no doubt. So, you know, from the Court's standpoint, I've read the decision. like to know what each side's view as to how to proceed at this point.

Mr. Steinberg.

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MR. STEINBERG: Good morning, Your Honor. Our view |12| -- let me just describe something as to the general case, and 13 let me then turn specifically to the second motion to enforce.

First, the case was decided by the Second Circuit on July 13th, and we are going to be moving for a rehearing on -for the panel and a rehearing on bond, which would have to be filed within 14 days or by July 27th. So presently, for that case, the mandate is still in the Second Circuit until that is 19 determined.

Second, and I apologize for this, Your Honor, and I promise that we will be better next time in trying to inform you of proceedings that are going on in other courts. So in case Your Honor had not been aware of it, Judge Furman, in a multi-district litigation, has scheduled a telephonic 25  $\parallel$  conference for 2:30 this afternoon, trying to inquire for the

same issues that Your Honor has, now that the Second Circuit 2 decision has come down, how does that impact, if at all, the 3 next bellwether trial, which is the <u>Coppola</u> trial. So there is a status conference on -- telephonically this afternoon.

The next MDL conference is July 28th. Judge Furman 6 has also said to the parties involved in that litigation, I want you to be prepared to say how the Second Circuit ruling affects the entire case before me. So parties are now presently trying to understand and set forth what their positions will be in connection with that status conference. Already, I think there's been correspondence that have indicated that the plaintiffs will want to amend their third amended complaint in view of the Second Circuit decision and have asked for approximately 60 days for purposes of doing that, as well, too. I don't know whether that's been agreed to or not, but I'm trying to indicate to you there's a state of flux going on in proceedings with regard to the Second Circuit 18 decision outside of this courtroom.

In Texas, there's an MDL proceeding. It's called -and the first bellwether trial, which is an ignition switch case, is the <u>Stevens</u> case. Your Honor might remember that we had filed a motion to enforce in connection with Stevens, and there was some interim relief that the parties had agreed to 24 $\parallel$  before the Second Circuit decision, and we carried the second motion to enforce to August 5th. So we have a return date on

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And then, just to sort of round out, when we --THE COURT: Let me just say -- well, go ahead, 4 Mr. Steinberg.

MR. STEINBERG: So in the Stevens case, there is a 6 motion for summary judgment that is going to be heard by the Texas state court on July 29th. So there's a lot of flurry of activity in Stevens, and the trial is supposed to start on August 9th, something in the first two weeks of August. people are trying to figure out whether they want to go forward, not go forward, and how the Second Circuit opinion impacts them.

With regard to matters before Your Honor, the only 14 thing that I think I can recollect that has been stayed pending the result of the Second Circuit is the Pilgrim matter, which 16 was filed back in the beginning of this year. It involved economic losses for non-ignition switch plaintiffs, and they 18 wanted to see what happened in the Second Circuit. 19 stipulation that Your Honor approved said that the parties are to meet and to confer within 21 days after the resolution in the Second Circuit. So with our moving to -- for rehearing on bond, I'm not sure when the 21 days is starting, but we have not communicated with the Pilgrim plaintiffs, and the Pilgrim plaintiffs have not communicated with us. All of this has come down fairly quickly since the Wednesday ruling.

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So this would be our thought process with regard to 2 the first motion to enforce that was filed in June and the 3 second motion to enforce that was filed in June, both of which 4 relate to post-closing accidents with vehicles without the  $5\parallel$  ignition switch defect. There -- in the first one, there was 6 the Fox matter, and then there's <u>Tibbetts and Chapman</u>. Fox was resolved by stipulation that Your Honor had approved. not our intention to try to do anything further in this court with regard to Fox. Whatever happens with that trial, they're coming in September, and whatever skirmishes are happening, we're happy to let trial counsel and Mr. Butler battle it out in the Georgia state court.

Tibbetts and Chapman, Your Honor, had taken the matter under advisement and is waiting for the next hearing date, which was today, to see what the other people were gonna do. But my feeling on Tibbetts and Chapman is that if anybody feels that the Second Circuit opinion impacted the positions that they had stated already that are before Your Honor so that counsel for Tibbetts and Chapman should file a pleading to supplement whatever they've done, and we will respond to whatever they file, and then Your Honor will have the complete record for that first motion to enforce.

With regard to the second motion to enforce, there 24 were 11 cases that were involved. Four of them had objected. Seven had not. I think with regard to all 11, they should be 1 given the same opportunity to, in effect, file a supplemental 2 pleading in view of the Second Circuit decision to say whatever 3 it is that they want to say about the impact of the Second 4 Circuit decision. And we will say that -- we will then respond  $5\parallel$  to that, and then Your Honor could hold a hearing, if you want, 6 on that.

THE COURT: Mr. Steinberg, one of the things -- and I  $8 \parallel$  do have some specific questions. I recognize the mandate 9 hasn't issued from the Second Circuit. We'll see what happens there, but because at Page 65 of the Second Circuit's slip opinion, where the court addressed -- it's the paragraph starts:

> "Second, many of the peculiar facts discussed apply with less force to the non-ignition switch plaintiffs, who assert claims arising from other defects."

And then, it goes on from there, and -- skipping a little bit, it says, without factual findings relevant to determining knowledge, we have no basis for deciding whether notice was adequate, let alone whether enforcement of the sale order would violate procedural due process as to those claims.

Then, the next paragraph:

"To conclude, we reverse the bankruptcy court's decision insofar as it enforced the sale order to enjoin claims relating to the ignition switch

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And then, I'll leave something out. And then, it 3 says as to -- this is on Page 66: "As to claims based in 4 non-ignition switch defects, we vacate the bankruptcy court's decision to enjoin those claims" -- I'll leave the cite out --"and remand for further proceedings consistent with this opinion."

So, you know, when the mandate issues, I suppose that's what I'm being told. And what I -- well, you'll take 10∥ whatever further appellate steps you think is appropriate, but 11 what I want to happen, Mr. Steinberg, is not just -- I think 12 before people run off starting pleadings, you need to meet and 13 confer with the non-ignition switch plaintiffs and see whether 14 you can resolve issues about the effect -- let's assume that the mandate issues -- whether you're able to resolve issues. Ι mean, the opinion addresses whether the sale order covers independent claims. It concludes it doesn't. And I heard argument the last go-around about what are alleged independent 19 claims or not. And so what I think needs to happen is you need to confer with the plaintiffs in those cases and to see to what extent you're able to consensually resolve any issues. I want to hear from other counsel on one of the issues.

It does seem to me in light of what I read at Page 65 is there's going to be an issue whether there needs to be discovery with respect to Old GM's knowledge about non-ignition

switch defects, and you need to proactively discuss with the 2 plaintiffs' counsel whether you can reach an agreement on what, 3 if any. Your position may be no discovery. Their position may  $4 \parallel$  be, yes, we need discovery, but you need to -- when you come 5 back, when everybody comes back here, I want to know that there 6 had been a discussion about what, if any, discovery of Old GM's knowledge or New GM's knowledge about non-ignition switch defects. I don't know, for example, maybe it was in papers, I didn't see it, whether there have been any recalls by New GM of -- for any of the alleged non-ignition switch defects, and I would assume that that -- if there were, you know, that will, no doubt, spur discussion or discovery about who knew what and 13 when.

So I guess what I'm telling you, Mr. Steinberg, I think that before you just tell the plaintiffs if they think there's some pleading they want to file, go ahead and file it, I'm directing that in light of the Second Circuit's opinion, you know, if you want to wait until the mandate issues, you'll do that, but I'm not sure that you ought to do that. you just ought to start talking now. And when the mandate issues, that's when I want you all coming back here. It may -when did you say the next date was, August what, 4th?

MR. STEINBERG: August 5th.

THE COURT: 5th.

MR. STEINBERG: August 5th.

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THE COURT: Yeah. I get back from vacation the day  $2 \parallel$  before that hearing, and I think we're going to need to -- you 3 know, this has now become a more complicated set of issues that  $4 \parallel I've$  got to deal with, and I think some more time may be 5 needed. Certainly, if there are going to be additional pleadings, you ought to try and reach an agreement on a schedule for each side filing additional pleadings. But that's -- let me hear from other counsel.

Go ahead, Mr. Steinberg.

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MR. STEINBERG: I have two other issues that I want to --

THE COURT: And I have some other questions, but for 12 13 now --

MR. STEINBERG: -- you know --

THE COURT: -- go ahead.

MR. STEINBERG: One is that -- to put it on the table -- and Your Honor heard some of this argument before on the  $18 \parallel$  June motions to enforce with the colloquy that I had with 19∥Mr. Steel, which is for the non-ignition switch plaintiffs that the Second Circuit is referring to and whether it's what I call the Gary Peller represented clients or whether it's a much broader group. And we have specific arguments, including the footnote that's in the Second Circuit opinion, to argue that what the Second Circuit was talking about there was only what would have been appealed in front of the Second Circuit, which

1 were Gary Peller type clients and not for --

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THE COURT: Yeah. And, you know, sometimes,  $3 \parallel Mr$ . Steinberg, the law of the circuit, whether the parties are 4 before the court or not and whether it's binding on other  $5\parallel$  parties, it may be persuasive as to that. There may be law of 6 the circuit as to them. So I'm not making any decisions about it, but whether there are non-ignition switch defect cases that were not before the circuit, after the last hearing, you did send me the transcript from the Second Circuit argument, which I reviewed, and there was some brief mention of non-ignition switch plaintiffs in there.

MR. STEINBERG: The other thing, Your Honor, I just 13 want to say, without trying to argue the point is that that, I think, is actually a point that will need to be fleshed out. And there is Supreme Court precedent that says that if an order 16 was final, then the fact that that party had the opportunity to and did not raise a due process violation means that they  $18 \parallel$  cannot do it now because the concept of finality trumps that. And so we would like the ability to brief that issue to Your Honor in the context of trying to frame what it is that we think is before Your Honor.

The second thing is that the Second Circuit clearly 23 was not dealing with post-closing accident cases in the context 24 of that appeal. And there was a separate proceeding that took place after the April decision and the June judgment, which led

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to the November decision and the December judgment. And there, 2 there was only a very limited appeal of Judge Gerber's ruling, where he had made specific rulings about non-ignition switch 4 plaintiffs, about their ability to assert independent claims. The appeal on that is before Judge Furman and was stayed subject to the ruling in the Second Circuit. So one of the issues that we will also want to be able to brief to somebody, I'm not sure exactly which court, is what is the impact of the fact that there was a December judgment dealing with these issues that have not been appealed and that was subsequent to the decision which didn't relate specifically to post-closing accidents, what is the impact of those events in the context of this case. And I think we need to be able to flesh that, as well. Now, it may be that through the meet and confer process, we'll talk about how that should be done, but I wanted to be able to flag to Your Honor that those are two issues that we have been thinking about in the context of the Second Circuit decision.

THE COURT: Yeah. And I quess you'll have to address this because to the extent that you're arguing there was no appeal and the judgment's final, you know, Rule 9024 incorporates Rule 60, and 60(b)(4), the judgment is void. That's, you know, under 60(c), timing and the effect of the motion. For reasons under (1), (2), and (3), there's a one-year time limit, but not if the judgment's void.

don't know. I'm not making any --

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MR. STEINBERG: Right.

THE COURT: I'm just -- you know, it gets complicated, Mr. Steinberg.

MR. STEINBERG: And then, Your Honor, the purpose of 6 the status conference was, one, to -- for me to be educated both by Your Honor and to see what the plaintiffs are doing. Everybody has got their parts --

> THE COURT: Right.

MR. STEINBERG: -- and no one's applying them as of 11 yet, and Your Honor wants to have an organized procedure.

THE COURT: I do. And I want -- on this issue of the 13 organized procedure, I don't want -- I really don't want to get all these motions seriatim. I'd like the parties to agree on a 15∥ schedule that will get the range of issues -- if you say Peller 16 clients did appeal and if you acknowledge whatever effect comes from that as to others who didn't appeal, it may raise this question under Rule 60(b) as to whether they can still challenge it now. I'd like to get those -- the full -- so I'm 20 seeing the whole range of issues at one time.

MR. STEINBERG: And one final comment. Your Honor  $22\parallel$  has witnessed, from the motions to enforce and the response, is 23 that when we tried to do this first with Judge Gerber, we tried 24 to have an organized procedure. We tried to make it binding on 25∥ all parties. We tried to make it so that when the judge ruled,

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it would be binding across the board. In the context about  $2 \parallel \text{trying to enforce what Judge Gerber had ruled, we were getting}$ responses that said, I didn't know I was a party, I didn't --4 it wasn't clear enough, I don't think the procedure was right,  $5 \parallel I$  don't think -- it should have been done in a different way. 6 And we, like you, want to avoid any of those arguments afterwards, which is that when Your Honor ultimately decides whatever issues are presented to Your Honor, it is binding across the board so that everybody knows what the rights are going forward. Thank you.

THE COURT: All right. Let me hear from other 12 counsel.

MR. WEINTRAUB: Good morning, Your Honor. William Weintraub of Goodwin Procter for the pre-closing ignition switch accident plaintiffs and for, in the first motions to enforce, Tibbetts, Chapman, and Fox.

Your Honor, our understanding, my understanding of 18 what happened earlier this morning was that with respect to Tibbetts and Chapman, the issue of independent claims and punitive damages that could be asserted in connection with that was carried forward, and -- to see what happened at the Second Circuit. Our view of what happened --

THE COURT: Happened faster than I thought it was, 24 but, you know, you --

MR. WEINTRAUB: Your Honor, I was at home preparing

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for a trial on something else, and I got the phone call. 2 really destroyed my day, but in a good way.

So our understanding was that this was held in abeyance pending what the Second Circuit was going to do. reading of what the Second Circuit did is unequivocal, and it said that the court did not have the power to bar independent claims against New GM for its own post-sale conduct. And, Your Honor, the portion of the opinion that you were focused on today, Page 65, we believe was dealing with the successful liability issue and not with the independent claim issue.

THE COURT: Well, yeah, I've got those pages marked, 12 too, where I -- I've certainly read the point about what they've said about independent claims. You know, Mr. Weintraub, I think when you were here last time, and one of the issues that may be an issue as we go forward, it looked to me that -- perhaps not your clients, I don't know -- but some of the plaintiffs were trying to bootstrap and independent claims argument by really challenging conduct of Old GM. we had a colloquy about, you know, whether knowledge could be imputed, et cetera. I'm not going to go through that now.

So, I mean, some of the issue about independent claims, I don't know -- I mean, if they're truly independent claims, I thought Judge Gerber said they could go forward. not sure anything changed about that. Certainly, the Second Circuit's opinion, he didn't get reversed on that part. I mean

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             MR. WEINTRAUB: Exactly.
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             THE COURT:
                         Okay.
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             MR. WEINTRAUB: So -- and --
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             THE COURT: But the question is what are independent
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   claims.
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             MR. WEINTRAUB:
                             Exactly.
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             THE COURT: And if you're trying to bootstrap
   so-called independent claims by improperly raising Old GM
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  conduct, that's a separate issue, but --
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             MR. WEINTRAUB: I understand, Your Honor.
12 that the Second Circuit defined independent claims at Page 40.
   And I think the colloquy that you and I had last time was once
   GM -- New GM is aware of information or knowledge acquired from
   Old GM, our view is, and we think that Judge Gerber will agree
   with us, that becomes New GM knowledge. And then --
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             THE COURT:
                        Well, let's -- we'll see about that.
18 We'll see about that. The Second Circuit opinion, Judge
19 Gerber's opinion, has very long recitations about the facts
   specifically relating to the ignition switch defect and what
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   knowledge Old GM had at various times and what people were
   saying within Old GM about it. So don't tell me that that
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automatically means that anybody with a non-ignition switch

is no factual record on which to base that at this point.

defect gets the benefit of imputation. None of that -- there

MR. WEINTRAUB: And I would disagree with that, Your 2 Honor. My point is a slightly different point.

THE COURT: Okay.

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MR. WEINTRAUB: It's not an imputation point.  $5\parallel$  point is once the knowledge is in your files or in the minds of the people that have transferred from Old GM to New GM and you become aware of it, then it becomes your knowledge.

THE COURT: I don't believe the opinion is saying what you just said.

MR. WEINTRAUB: I understand, Your Honor. 11 be something for a later day.

With respect to some of the other things that 13 Mr. Steinberg said, we were here last time, and we briefed and we raised the due process issues, which we believe are different due process issues than the due process issues addressed in the four threshold issues. There, the due process was, was Old GM aware of or should it have been aware of the ignition switch defect and should it have been disclosed. 19 we're dealing with these motions to enforce, we're dealing with 20 post-closing accident claims. So the issue there is did people who were not yet injured or not yet had accidents and New GM who was not yet in existent, did the Court have the authority to prospectively release New GM from actions it hadn't taken 24 $\parallel$  yet with respect to independent claims. We think that's a different due process issue, and we don't think that that due

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1 process issue was either properly set up in connection with the 2 September 23 scheduling order.

And as we talked about at the last hearing, we  $4 \parallel$  thought and we contended that the letters that were sent to 5 people were misleading because it said independent claims are  $6\parallel$  allowed, and they all thought, well, that's right, independent claims are allowed. So our position is that there was nothing that compelled people to appear at the November briefings, and there was nothing that warned those people that due process rights may be forever foreclosed and independent claims issues may be ever foreclosed. Understand, now that we're all aware of this going forward, the next time we do this, it'll be done more carefully, but our position is that what happened last 14 time didn't bar the plaintiffs who are defending themselves.

THE COURT: And Mr. Weintraub, after you confer with 16 Mr. Steinberg and others representing New GM and see what -- in terms of procedures, if there are going to be discovery issues, 18 you'll discuss that. All of it's going to come back to me at one hearing, so I have the full range of issues that are being raised as to what's barred by the sale order, what's not barred by the sale order.

Thank you, Your Honor. And I think MR. WEINTRAUB: just one last point. Your Honor, so there are no surprises, 24 $\parallel$  the Court may recall that it entered a stipulation and order with respect to the <a>Fox</a> plaintiffs. I'm told -- and this will 1 have to be verified in a transcript -- that that stipulation 2 may have been violated at a hearing in the non-bankruptcy court, and they would be bringing that to your attention, Your Honor.

> THE COURT: Okay.

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Thank you, Your Honor. MR. WEINTRAUB:

THE COURT: Mr. Weisfelner.

MR. WEISFELNER: Your Honor, for the record, Ed Weisfelner, Brown Rudnick, together with Sander -- not Sandra, Sander Esserman. We are designated counsel for the ignition switch plaintiffs.

Your Honor, I just want to advise the Court and the other parties that consistent with the Second Circuit ruling with regard to vacatur of the equitable mootness --

THE COURT: That's what I have a question about. Go 16 ahead.

MR. WEISFELNER: -- issue, we will work as best we  $18 \parallel$  can with the GUC Trust and the GUC unit holders, but we do 19∥ intend to seek relief from this Court for authority to file 20 late proofs of claim.

THE COURT: Can I ask you -- at Page 17 of the 22 $\parallel$  opinion, the Second Circuit Judge Chin said the sale agreement also imposes an accordion feature to ensure the GUC Trust would 24 remain adequately funded. In the event that the amount of unsecured claims grew too large, the accordion feature provided

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1 that if the bankruptcy court makes the finding that the 2 estimated aggregate allowed general unsecured claims against Old GM's estate exceeded \$35 billion, then New GM will issue 4 ten million additional shares of common stock to Old GM. is Page 17. I take it those additional shares never did issue.

MR. WEISFELNER: Correct. As best as I can recall, in terms of round numbers, the aggregate amount of allowed claims against the GUC Trust is some \$32 billion. So the trigger for the accordion feature never occurred. And by the way, I think it's a sliding scale. In other words, once you hit 35, you don't get all of the stock, you get the stock on a sliding scale up to the maximum amount.

THE COURT: I take it that's what this is about in part, Mr. Weisfelner.

MR. WEISFELNER: Well, there's two things. Number one, it's a question of would the claims that the ignition switch plaintiffs have --

THE COURT: Would they have been claims.

MR. WEISFELNER: -- were they to have been claims and were the Court ultimately to allow those claims to be filed, would they ultimately trigger the \$35 billion threshold amount, how far above the 35 billion would you go, and how much of the so-called accordion feature would be available.

Now, not that they need anyone to speak for them, but 25 $\parallel$  I assume that the GUC Trust would say, well, even assuming all

1 that's true, it leaves open the question of what happens to the  $2 \parallel$  accordion value, who does it go to. Our position would be, 3 well, given that you've already distributed somewhere between  $4 \parallel 75$  and 90 percent of all of the value you ever had, and if you 5 assume that we should have been in line on day one, that in a 6 minimum, in order to make up the shortfall of not having been around when 75 to 90 percent of your trust was distributed, we are to get priority, if not the exclusive right, to the accordion feature. That's another set of issues.

Frankly, there is yet again a set of issues. understanding is that the GUC Trust currently has something less than \$500 million still available, and this issue came up before Judge Gerber in another context, but the question is we understood the GUC Trust to be in a position to want to distribute most of that remaining value on or about November of this year. We're going to want to talk to the GUC Trust about whether or not it's still their intention to move forward, and if so, some procedure to bring issues relating to that intention before the Court. We're going to try and do it in a coordinated, consolidated way so you don't get seriatim filings and pleadings in this regard.

I should also mention, because they're here, the 23 avoidance action trust. To the extent that there is a recovery for the benefit of that trust, since it all relates back to the original beneficiaries of timely filed proofs of claim, that

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1 the ignition switch plaintiffs may very well have rights with 2 regard to any recovery, and we will be talking to Wilmington 3 and counsel for that trust in an effort to, again, try and 4 bring the procedural context to the floor in a way that makes 5 sense to the Court.

THE COURT: I'm not -- I'm going to ask a question. I have no idea whether -- what -- so what's the current value 8 of ten million GM shares? I guess you really wouldn't know what currently has been issued. Is there some estimate of what 10 the value of --

MR. WEISFELNER: The way I remember it is again you 12∥ have a sliding scale. If we were to establish \$10 billion worth of damages, you would trigger the accordion and you'd get  $14 \parallel$  to the maximum amount of value that that accordion could derive, and the number, if I recall, is just under a billion dollars' worth of GM stock value. Now, it ratchets down if you go, you know, a lower amount of claims.

> Okay. Thanks, Mr. Weisfelner. THE COURT:

MR. WEISFELNER: Thank you, Judge.

THE COURT: Anybody else want to be heard?

Mr. Flaxer? 21

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Steinberg, you'll get your chance.

Mr. Flaxer?

Mr. FLAXER: Morning, Your Honor. Jonathan Flaxer of 25∥Golenbock, Eiseman, Assor, Bell & Peskoe on behalf of the

1 Groman plaintiffs. I'm here with my co-counsel, Alex Schmidt,  $2 \parallel \text{Wolf Haldenstein.}$  I just wanted to observe that we have a 3 pending adversary proceeding, and to the extent the designated 4 counsel and we, in discussions, decide that that would be a  $5\parallel$  good vehicle to use to pursue a late claim, we're happy to do 6 that. If they have another way to do it, we're willing to basically speak with them and figure out what to do with that pending adversary proceeding.

THE COURT: Okay. Thanks, Mr. Flaxer.

Anybody -- before Mr. Steinberg gets up, anybody else wish to be heard?

All right, Mr. Steinberg, go ahead.

MR. MARKOWITZ: Your Honor?

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THE COURT: Oh, wait. Yes, go ahead. Who's on the 15 phone?

MR. MARKOWITZ: Joshua Markowitz on behalf of Brianna 17 Minard.

> THE COURT: I'm sorry, just say it again, please.

MR. MARKOWITZ: Sure. Joshua Markowitz on behalf of 20 Brianna Minard.

THE COURT: Okay, go ahead.

MR. MARKOWITZ: Yes, Your Honor. I -- hearing that 23 we're talking about setting a schedule going forward, I'm 24 confused and concerned that two groups are getting lumped together, and I want to make sure they're kept separate, and

that's the post-sale accident plaintiffs and those non-ignition 2 switch plaintiffs who haven't had an accident or are just 3 seeking economic damages. And I think what the Second Circuit opinion makes clear is for the post-sale accident, based upon independent claims, there is no due process requirement. don't have to show that Old GM or New GM knew of us and should have told us about the bankruptcy because they say the sale order simply doesn't affect those groups of people.

So Your Honor's talking about discovery into GM  $10 \parallel \text{knowledge}$ . Old GM's knowledge is relevant to the post-sale accident independent parties merely to show they had knowledge and they continue to have that knowledge as New GM, and then it becomes an issue of state court law as to whether that knowledge, along with New GM's post-sale conduct, imposed a duty to the injured person. And the November decision by Judge Gerber makes it clear that's not for a bankruptcy court to decide. That's for a state court to decide.

So GM can make the argument that, hey, they're not 19 really being punished -- they're not really -- the liability isn't based on New GM's conduct, it's really based on Old GM's conduct, but that's an issue of state law. Under California law, does the fact that they acquired the good will, they continued to build the vehicles, they continued to inform the public about the safety of those vehicles, did that create a duty, and that's not something that's appropriate for the

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1 bankruptcy court. I think those should go to the state court.
 2 So what I do want to make sure is when you get --
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             THE COURT: You can argue what you want, but you're
 4 \parallel going to do it in a pleading before me and not on the
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  telephone.
             MR. MARKOWITZ: Okay, Your Honor.
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             THE COURT: Just bear with me a second,
 8 Mr. Steinberg.
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             MR. MARKOWITZ: Then, that's all I have.
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             THE COURT: Anybody else on the phone who wants to be
11 heard?
             All right. I just want to find something,
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13 Mr. Steinberg, okay?
             Mr. ESSERMAN: Your Honor, this is Sandy Esserman.
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   just wanted to enter an appearance. That's all.
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             THE COURT: Okay, Mr. Esserman, thank you.
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             I can't find -- I saw some reference that Judge
18 Furman entered a ruling with respect to --
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             MR. STEINBERG: I have that on my list.
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             THE COURT: -- economic loss. Could you enlighten me
   about that?
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             MR. STEINBERG: Sure. Last week, and I can't
23 remember whether it was Wednesday or Thursday, Judge Furman
24 \parallel entered a decision in connection with the third motion to -- in
25\parallel connection with a motion to dismiss, and I guess the reason is
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1 because my workday didn't end on the weekend. The motion -- he 2 entered a decision with regard to New GM vehicles, so it didn't involve Old GM vehicles, but the issue that he was -- rendered a lengthy decision had significant impact up to the theory of damages that had been asserted by the lead counsel in the MDL with regard to the New GM vehicles. But that was the same theory of damages that they had also asserted in connection with Old GM vehicles before Judge Gerber had ruled. So Judge Furman's decision -- and if Your Honor -- if it's easier for Your Honor, we can easily send that to Your Honor's chambers.

> THE COURT: I would appreciate it.

MR. STEINBERG: Okay. So we will do that this afternoon. So people are digesting that decision from Friday. It was a lengthy decision, as well, too. It has major ramifications with regard to the ability to have class status.

THE COURT: I guess the ABI newsroom had it on one of their -- that's where I saw it this morning.

MR. STEINBERG: So that was another thing. And, Your 19∥ Honor, just to be complete, as well, too, we will send you -- I don't know if there's going to be a transcript for this afternoon's conference with Judge Furman. If there is one, then we will send you that transcript, as well. I just don't know -- I assume he's going to record it, and if he is, we'll share that then and we'll CC the lead counsel so they know that's what we're communicating.

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THE COURT: Yeah. I haven't -- I may reach out to  $2 \parallel$  talk to Judge Furman directly. I'll probably wait until after 3 he has his conference this afternoon, but you know, whether  $4 \parallel$  he'll want to talk to me about it or not, I don't know. 5 only had -- after the Motors Liquidation matters were 6 reassigned to me, Judge Furman and I had a brief conversation way back, but have not spoken since. I don't talk substance with other judges, but in terms of understanding the procedural context of what he's got and what I've got, I may well reach out to talk to him.

MR. STEINBERG: I think anybody in the courtroom will 12 correct me if I'm wrong, but I'm pretty sure that both Judge Furman and Judge Gerber have disclosed that they have had discussions before, as well, so --

THE COURT: I'm aware that they --

MR. STEINBERG: -- it would be not uncommon.

THE COURT: No, I'm aware that they did, and what I 18∥usually try to do is if I speak with another judge who's got parallel proceedings, at a next hearing, I'll usually just very briefly give a summary of it. Not chapter and verse, but just briefly that I spoke to Judge So-and-So and generally we discussed the following. So I try to make it transparent as to what I've done, but I'm just alerting you today that I may well reach out until after he has his -- I wasn't aware there was a hearing this afternoon, so I'll wait certainly until after that

occurs.

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MR. STEINBERG: The two other points, Your Honor, is 3 that Mr. Markowitz, just to connect the dots, represents  $4 \parallel \text{Minard}$ , who is one of the people who objected on the second 5 motion to enforce. And so whatever he was saying as to the 6 basis of how to interpret the Second Circuit ruling was the kind of thing that I had said that at some point in time after a meet of confer, if he thought that the Second Circuit had given him another argument or a different argument, he would  $10 \parallel$  have the opportunity to do that, and we would have the opportunity to respond. And I've been reluctant to try to say every time someone has tried to suggest how the Second Circuit opinion affected what happened to immediately say why I disagree.

> THE COURT: Right.

MR. STEINBERG: But recognize that we do have a position and we will want to present it, and we do think it's important to do it on papers with everybody participating so that when Your Honor rules, you will rule -- if you rule in our favor, it will be binding on everyone, and if you rule against us, I know it was going to be collateral estoppel against us anyway, but at least I want to have the benefit of affirmative collateral estoppel.

THE COURT: Just on that point, you know, I know from 25 $\parallel$  your prior argument on the motion to enforce, Mr. Weintraub's

argument that, well, people didn't really know they had to 2 appear, they weren't given proper notice of that, the letters 3 were vague or -- I'm not faulting either side on it, but it 4 really is important if you want to bind people that they 5 receive proper notice, they know exactly what's coming up. And I do -- I may sound like a broken record on this. there are, you know, there are differences between different groups of plaintiffs and what their arguments are, and I'm obviously much newer to this than Judge Gerber was, when I rule, I want to try and make sure I'm seeing how all of these pieces arguably fit together so I don't enter a ruling and then somebody else comes in with a motion two weeks later with some different set of facts. So to the extent possible, I'd like a schedule that gets as much as possible before me at the same hearing with people having an opportunity to brief and stuff.

It may be, Mr. Steinberg, that you'll resolve some issues with some parties. You know, for example, on issues of non-ignition switch plaintiffs are raising due process arguments, your position is they may not be entitled to discovery. Their position is they may not need discovery. Their position is we want discovery. I want that addressed. And so if parties are agreeing as to what discovery will be permitted and what time period in which that will occur, you know, I want that. So before the hearing is going to get scheduled, to the extent things can be covered by agreement,

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1 that will be a status letter ahead of time that reflects what  $2 \parallel$  are agreements, if there are proposed stipulations, that they're before me so I can try and deal with as much of it as 4 possible.

MR. STEINBERG: So Your Honor understands, that is 6 clearly the goal. And so Your Honor understands some of the difficulties in meeting the goal, as reflected from the history  $8 \parallel$  of the last proceeding, is my recollection was -- and I could be off by this, but after we had the September 3 status 10 conference and before Judge Gerber ruled, there may have been another hundred cases that have been filed so that people seem 12 to file it not with regard -- without regard to whether they should or they shouldn't, but we're dealing with a moving target, and we'll try to --

THE COURT: People may want to wait until the Court 16 rules and then go ahead and say, well, we weren't before you and --

MR. STEINBERG: Right. The final thing --

THE COURT: It's not unknown.

MR. STEINBERG: The final thing -- and Your Honor may have further questions or not, but the final thing I just wanted to mention is that Mr. Weisfelner mentioned the accordion feature, the ability to file a late-filed claim, and we'll see whatever the papers are and we'll see whatever those discussions are. The only thing I would like to say is that

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obviously New GM is potentially financially impacted by  $2 \parallel$  whatever happens, and we consider ourselves a party in interest. And so either they will include us as part of the 4 discussions or we will be before Your Honor in connection with 5 any type of resolution that is had to the extent that we 6 believe it affects New GM's rights.

THE COURT: Yeah. I mean, you know, when I read the Second Circuit opinion, this provision on Page 17 about the accordion feature wasn't then linked when the Court vacated the equitable mootness decision, but it did click with me that that seemed to me to be an important set of issues, so --

MR. STEINBERG: And for whatever it's worth, the 13 passage that you read, which said the accordion feature was done so that the trust would need to be funded, that wasn't the purpose of an accordion feature. I think -- whatever it is, 16 our belief is that the Second Circuit got it wrong. accordion feature was to reflect the fact that going into the  $18 \parallel$  sale, no one really knew the magnitude of the claims in the 19 case, and therefore they created a flexible purchase price to the extent that it turned out after the claims resolution process, which was a post-sale process, that it exceeded a certain threshold, that instead of being a pure pot plan, they would increase the consideration to take effect to how it 24 resolved the sale, right.

THE COURT: You're saying that wouldn't apply if

1 relief to file late claims was granted and \$7 billion -- just a 2 | hypothetical number of late claims were filed and it brought  $3 \parallel$  you over the trigger for the accordion? I'm not saying that's 4 happening, but I just --

MR. STEINBERG: But I don't think our position is 6 that the accordion -- that that would not apply, but I think that there are defenses with regard to the accordion feature 8 that we would present to Your Honor, and there are ramifications for seeking relief against Old GM, which we will  $10 \parallel$  present to Your Honor on papers at the appropriate time, but clearly, clearly if they had timely filed a proof of claim and that had taken it over the \$35 billion threshold, then that 13 would have triggered the accordion feature.

There are issues that Judge Gerber had to grapple with, which Your Honor may be familiar with, which is whether there was a strategic decision not to file claims and that there was a concession made that they --

THE COURT: Well, maybe they didn't think there was 19 going to be enough money to pay them. I don't know, but --

MR. STEINBERG: Well, whatever it is, whatever it is, there are ramifications upon actions which may have impact as to whether the accordion is triggered. But I just wanted to explain to Your Honor that the accordion feature was a flexibility in the purchase price that was supposed to be paid in the event that the claims resolved greater than a certain

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amount, and it had nothing to do with funding the GUC Trust. 2 The GUC Trust was essentially funded by the billion one that was set aside in cash as part of the cash consideration.

THE COURT: There was 10 percent of the stock that 5 was part of the --

MR. STEINBERG: Yeah, but there was a cash consideration.

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THE COURT: I understand that, but there was also 10 percent of the stock.

MR. STEINBERG: I agree. I agree with that, but I think people were -- when they were negotiating the cash consideration, instead of touching the stock, they wanted to make sure there was enough cash to administer. And whether that's turned out or not, they always had the ability to rely on the stock, but it wasn't a funding issue.

THE COURT: It may be even premature to raise this, but you know, when I read the opinion several times already and 18 saw the thing about the accordion feature and saw the vacating 19 $\parallel$  the equitable mootness decision, then was going to ask some questions about it today. You know, it does strike me, Mr. Steinberg, that -- I'm not -- obviously, the cases that are before Judge Furman, they're before him, they're not before me, but one thing that strikes me is there may be new issues to 24 talk about in mediation if -- put it this way, if New GM's 25 $\parallel$  going to pay one way or the other, it might be better to find a

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consensual resolution. And it won't be before me, you know, at  $2 \parallel$  this stage. I don't get involved in settlement discussions, but, you know, it may be appropriate at some point to resume a 4 mediation to see whether you can short circuit a lot of issues  $5 \parallel$  that might otherwise have to be dealt with. But I just -that's something to just kind of throw out.

MR. STEINBERG: I don't think Mr. Weisfelner has been shy in saying if I can't go through one door, there's a possibility that I can go through another door.

THE COURT: Well, I've never seen Mr. Weisfelner being shy, so --

MR. STEINBERG: Anyway, Your Honor --

THE COURT: Not to stand, I guess, but --

MR. STEINBERG: Your Honor, so we will do our best to have a meet and confer. We will just -- Your Honor knows there -- in the MDL, there's a structure about how to bring other plaintiffs and state courts involved. We will try to push as much as we can to make sure that those people are brought in to the extent that lead counsel believes they need to be brought 20 in so they will buy into a process.

We will try to work with your chambers, not with regard to the August 5th date, but to try to get a new date that pushes it back a little bit further. I do think for purposes of today, we may have gone as far as we can go, and I think we need to actually now engage the other side --

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THE COURT: You do.
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             MR. STEINBERG: -- instead of staring at each.
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             THE COURT: You do. And I -- you know, engage the
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   other side doesn't mean just filing briefs. It does mean
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   actually engaging and talking and see what -- okay, all right.
             MR. STEINBERG:
                             Thank you.
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             THE COURT: All right. Ms. Weisfelner?
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             MR. WEISFELNER: Your Honor, just to make sure the
   record is clear, and I may not be shy, but I hope I'm always
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   reserved.
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             THE COURT:
                         Well --
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             MR. WEISFELNER: I said I hope.
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             THE COURT: Hope springs eternal, Mr. Weisfelner.
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             MR. WEISFELNER:
                              Springs eternal. Your Honor, I
   think, made reference to mediation. You have to be aware that,
   to my knowledge, certainly not at the bankruptcy court level
   and I doubt at the MDL level, has there been any mediation
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   effort to date, but just so that the -- Your Honor's clear.
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             THE COURT: Wait, Mr. Steinberg, wait, wait, wait.
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             MR. WEISFELNER: With regard to the late claims, and
   I appreciate Mr. Steinberg's desire to be involved, and I know
   he knows how to get involved, and my guess is that his position
   will get heard in one forum or another, but the procedure under
24 the GUC Trust for the allowance of claims puts the GUC Trust in
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a position of either allowing, disallowing, or objecting to

1 claims and doesn't put GM, even though it's its stock that's 2 the subject of the accordion feature, in the position of a  $3 \parallel$  normal debtor-in-possession who objects to claims. obviously, he's not shy nor resolved about stating his 5 position.

THE COURT: And you're not shy, and so the two of you ought to be talking to each other, okay.

MR. WEISFELNER: And we will.

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THE COURT: All right. Mr. Steinberg.

MR. STEINBERG: Just one thing, and maybe Mr. Weisfelner wasn't aware of it, in the MDL proceeding, there is a magistrate that's been appointed that is, in essence, a settlement type judge, and there's been ongoing discussions.

THE COURT: Who is that?

MR. STEINBERG: We would -- we'll supply it. I just 16 remember. It's a magistrate that Judge Furman appointed. There's been ongoing discussions. There's been ongoing settlements of individual cases going on throughout the MDL. 19 So -- but that doesn't mean that there -- at some point in time, there shouldn't be a broader effort to figure out how to resolve these issues, but that clearly involves people way beyond -- other than me, other decisions to be made, and I'm not prepared to go further. I just wanted to point that to 24 Your Honor, that there was a mechanism and a structure that is 25 $\parallel$  going on in the district court now.

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THE COURT: Sure. And I would fully expect that. 2 You know, those are individual cases, and you know, cases 3 settle, don't settle, reaches decisions, whatever. I -- you 4 know, just from reading 360 Bankruptcy, I mean, I know that  $5\parallel$  with 360Law [sic] that cases have settled or are dismissed or 6 whatever. But let's leave it at that.

MR. STEINBERG: But Judge Furman's agenda that he sets for each of these bimonthly now conferences, the last item on every one of those agendas for more than a year has been settlement possibilities discussions. So the issue hasn't been lost on the MDL court, and the issue is not lost on me that Your Honor has alluded to that in the context of today's conference. Thank you.

THE COURT: Okay, thank you.

All right. Anybody else wish to be heard? Anybody 16 on the telephone?

MR. MARKOWITZ: Your Honor, Josh --

THE COURT: Go ahead. Start -- and I didn't hear 19 your name, please.

MR. MARKOWITZ: I'm Joshua Markowitz --

THE COURT: Yes, Mr. Markowitz?

MR. MARKOWITZ: -- on behalf of Brianna Minard. Just wanted a clarification because obviously there are ongoing state proceedings. We have a motion to amend currently before the state court, and I just wanted to -- are we enjoined from

doing that. You know, obviously, if there was a trial, that 2 might be a problem, but --

THE COURT: Mr. Markowitz, I think things are 4 actually fairly simple. If there's an injunction in place, it 5 remains in place. If -- I'm not entering any order vacating 6 injunctions or issuing injunctions. Whatever the existing orders provide, they still provide it. Obviously, the Second Circuit ruling is an important ruling. If you go ahead and violate an injunction, there are consequences for violating an 10∥ injunction. If you want to vacate an injunction, you're going 11 to have to follow my directive that I want all of this brought 12 before me at one hearing where all of the contestants are before me with briefs. So I'm not vacating injunctions or entering injunctions. Whatever the existing situation is, it remains that.

> Okay. We're adjourned. Thanks very much, everybody. (Proceedings concluded at 11:01 a.m.)

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## <u>CERTIFICATION</u>

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I, Alicia Jarrett, court-approved transcriber, hereby certify that the foregoing is a correct transcript from the official electronic sound recording of the proceedings in the above-entitled matter.

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ALICIA JARRETT, AAERT NO. 428

DATE: July 19, 2016

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### <u>CERTIFICATION</u>

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I, Lisa Luciano, court-approved transcriber, hereby 18 certify that the foregoing is a correct transcript from the 19 official electronic sound recording of the proceedings in the above-entitled matter.

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LISA LUCIANO, AAERT NO. 327

DATE: July 19, 2016

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